Skip to main content
Log in

Understanding West German economic growth in the 1950s

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Cliometrica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

We evaluate explanations for why Germany grew so quickly in the 1950s. The recent literature has emphasized convergence, structural change and institutional shake-up while minimizing the importance of the postwar shock. We show that this shock and its consequences were more important than neoclassical convergence and structural change in explaining the rapid growth of the West German economy in the 1950s. We find little support for the hypothesis of institutional shakeup. This suggests a different interpretation of post-World War II German economic growth than features in much of the literature.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See for example Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol et al. (1989).

  2. Britain had been the technological and productivity leader in Europe throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth and remains a useful point of comparison after World War II, as we shall see.

  3. This point has been made by authors from Kindleberger (1967) to Broadberry (1997) to Temin (2002). Broadberry (2006) also presents evidence of lagging productivity in Germany’s service sector, which points in the same direction.

  4. These were the predictions of the first generation of neoclassical growth theorists (see e.g. Solow 1957), whose work, not coincidentally, appeared at just this time.

  5. This framework has been influentially applied to Germany by Giersch et al. (1992). Olson himself applied his theory to post-World War II Europe in Olson (1996). Critical views are provided by Paqué (1994, 1996) and Carlin (1996).

  6. We describe the derivation of these estimates later in the paper.

  7. For the former see Acemoglu et al. (2005), and for the latter see Hall and Soskice (2001).

  8. This, of course, being the very period for which others argue that convergence and structural change were most important.

  9. International comparisons like those of Abramovitz (1986), Baumol et al. (1989), and Broadberry (1997) emphasize that Britain had been Europe’s technological leader in the nineteenth century, with its highest output per capita and the highest capital/labor ratio.

  10. In the neoclassical model with perfect competition and no externalities, the elasticity of output with respect to capital and capital’s share in national income can be shown to be equal.

  11. Assuming that TFP growth is unchanged (see e.g. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). We return momentarily to the assumption of an unchanged TFP growth rate.

  12. Under present assumptions, as much as three quarters of output growth remains to be explained. See Denison (1968) who similarly concluded that factor inputs explains only a quarter of the growth differential between the UK and West Germany.

  13. While the capital stock grew strongly, labor input in the German war economy actually fell. Table 4 provides rough estimates for the civilian population in 1944, including forced laborers. The German war economy relied massively on slave labor: the available estimates rise to 8.5 million for mid-1944, of whom about 3.8 million may have been in West Germany. At the same time, the cumulative figure for military recruiting stood at 18 million, of which 8.4 million were from West Germany. As female labor force participation was discouraged, (voluntary) female employment declined by about 10 percent during the war.

  14. In East Germany, the decline from the 1944 peak was stronger due to intense dismantling by the Soviets. However, even here the total decline just undid the wartime additions to the capital stock.

  15. In Table 5 we have attempted to exclude former slave laborers waiting to be repatriated from the population data for 1946. A population census in 1946 attempted to do just that but has been criticized for lacking reliability. However, most of these problems concern the Soviet occupation zone, whose data do not enter in Table 5. For a discussion, see Karlsch (1993).

  16. Even faster than in the slump of the early 1930s.

  17. In 1946-1947 coal was shipped across the Atlantic to make up for the supplies that were not forthcoming from the Ruhr, but these shipments made up only part of the shortfall.

  18. Note that these expansion paths are plotted on a semi-logarithmic scale. We chose 1900–1913 as the base period instead of starting even earlier because of the limitations of the German data, whose quality is inferior before 1900, but also because the turn of the century marked a shift in away from extensive growth (accompanied by falling fertility and emigration rates) and therefore a significant structural break. A related exercise with data extending back to 1870 was first made by Borchardt (1977, 1991).

  19. To establish the robustness of these results, we experimented with data from Maddison (1995) and Hoffmann and Müller (1959), extending the trend back to 1870. Although these backward extensions do affect the position of the German trend line, there is consistent evidence of German per-capita output growth having been about 40–50% higher than that of Britain in the last third of the nineteenth century. We also experimented with extending the British trend backwards and found it to be highly stable.

  20. Note that our estimate of German TFP growth, derived from the standard data set of Maddison (1991), is below companion estimates for the 1960s, probably because we use hours, not persons, and standardized, not raw capital stock data here. Inspection of the data reveals that Germany experienced another investment boom during that decade. But unlike in the 1950s, this investment boom failed to produce similarly high growth.

  21. Previous attempts to do this include Sicsic and Wyplosz (1996), Barro (1999) and Temple (2001).

  22. From 77.8% in 1950 to 86.7% in 1960. (Authors’ calculations from Table 1.).

  23. Using a more complex model, Temple (2001, p. 17) reaches similar results, that “the labour reallocation effect generally accounts for between a twentieth and a seventh of annual growth in output per worker.” For the period 1950–1955 his point estimate is 0.82 percent of output per worker per annum, almost exactly what we find under the TFP II variant. For 1955–1960 his point estimate is 0.58, midway between our TFP I and TFP II variants.

  24. Here we follow Temin, whose specification is more general.

  25. That is, Germany grew by an additional 1.08% per annum over and above what can be explained by the three independent variables and average European experience. The coefficient in question differs from zero at the 90% confidence level.

  26. Inserting the 1944/1946 gap, which underlies also the calculations in Table 5 above, would have yielded even better results. Working instead with the 1941/1946 gap thus biases the results in Table 6 against our working hypotheses of high GAP effects on the German economy.

  27. In the RHS panel of Table 6, we also measure the independent variables in logs, as is common in the literature on convergence regressions. Doing so improved the fit further and reduced the size of the dummy variable for Germany.

  28. Independently, Vonyó (2008) obtained results similar to ours from panel data on the OECD countries.

  29. Coined by ordo-liberal economist Alfred Müller-Armack in 1947, the term was originally supposed to hint to the welfare efficiency of the market process itself. Soon, however, it came to denote the specific West German synthesis between regulated capitalism and the Bismarckian welfare state. A collection of seminal essays of Germany’s ordo-liberals on the Social Market Economy is Koslowski (1998). Its architect, Ludwig Erhard, became a figure of mythical fame, as did the Bundesbank as the guardian of the deutschmark. Emblematic of this is a book by Erhard (1960) entitled Wohlstand für alle (or Prosperity for Everyone) Aimed to capitalize on Erhard’s reputation as the architect of Germany’s economic recovery, it shows a visibly overweight Erhard with his typical big cigar. Both the weight gain and the tobacco product conveyed the message that not just Erhard but everyone had made it.

  30. Abelshauser (1985) emphasized these facts. In a highly critical biography, Hentschel (1996) pictured Erhard’s policies as mostly failed. The biographies by Laitenberger (1986) and recently, Mierzejewski (2004) present more balanced accounts of Erhard’s successes and failures.

  31. Opposition to central planning came from circles both within and outside the party. From within, microeconomist von Stackelberg tried to build a network of pro-market experts, and to lobby the Berlin ministries (Anderson and LeRoy 1987). From outside, economists around von Beckerath (formerly Stackelberg’s thesis adviser at Cologne) and Eucken voiced their concerns and kept in close contact with political resistance circles. Despite strict censorship, Eucken (1940) published a book on economic systems, arguing that all forms of central planning inevitably led to socialism. This book later became formative for a generation of German postwar economists. Opposition to central planning enjoyed some degree of protection by a leading SS figure, Otto Ohlendorf, who headed SD Inland, the domestic Gestapo branch, since 1939, and who had led an Einsatzgruppe in 1941/1942. An economist of ardent pro-market convictions, he became undersecretary in the commerce ministry in 1943, and was also involved in organizing Erhard’s work, see Herbst (1982).

  32. The influence of large banks on German big business and the possible inofficial cartel structures created by this has continued to attract scholarly attention (e.g. Edwards and Fischer 1994), although historical research seems to imply that the influence of banks and financial conglomerates on German industry may in fact have been quite limited (see Wellhoener, 1989, for the imperial period, Wixforth 1995, for the Weimar Republic, and James 1995, 2001, and Feldman 2001, for the Nazi years).

  33. As one contemporary observed, the restrictive practices of trade associations were “the greatest single cause of the lack of all dynamism in British industry.” Cited in Harris (1972), p. 222. One attempt to measure this effect is in Crafts (1995): he includes in a cross-section model of the determinants of the determinants of productivity growth in the period 1954–63 (using data for 57 British industries) the change in the five-firm concentration ratio (as a measure of the scope for collusion), finding a negative coefficient on the margin of significance at the 10% confidence level.

  34. The commitment to nationalization had been given official status in Clause IV of the party’s 1918 constitution drafted by Sidney Webb.

  35. A similar point could be made for agriculture whose lobby remained intact and powerful despite the disappearance of the “Junker” class of the politically influential landed nobility. Here as much as in iron and steel, German regulations, often inherited from Nazi economic planning, were successively replaced by EEC-wide market control that attempted to regulate the market with very similar instruments (on this, see Kluge 1988).

  36. The act laid the administration of this levy in the hands of the entrepreneurs’ associations, again strengthening the informal cartels that allied legislation had sought to abolish (Adamsen 1981; Abelshauser 1984).

  37. Here too there is impressive evidence of institutional continuity: Broadberry and Crafts (1992) provide remarkably similar estimates for the interwar years.

  38. In a Nash bargain over the wage rate, unemployment may affect the bargaining position of the trade union. Broadberry (1994) and Broadberry and Crafts (1996) find evidence of this effect in postwar Britain. According to Lindlar and Holtfrerich (1997), unit labor costs started to rise at the end of the decade, and continued doing so until the labor market was opened to immigration from Southern Europe in the 1960s. Hence, to the extent that high initial unemployment reinforced the implicit contract trading in wage increases for higher investment, this effect became weaker over time.

  39. Commentators have sometimes argued that the country’s propensity to export capital was harmful for domestic investment, and also that Germany’s ability to generate current-account and export surpluses was an important engine of growth. Table 3 reminds the reader that these views cannot be true at the same time.

  40. This arrangement came to be known as the “Juliusturm.”The original Juliusturm was a tower in the fortress of Spandau near Berlin where Imperial Germany had hoarded French gold paid as reparations after the Franco-Prussian War of 1871.

  41. Analyzing German full employment budget surpluses, Berger (1997) similarly finds that the “Juliusturm” hoarding had strong procyclical effects.

References

  • Abelshauser W (1975) Wirtschaft in Westdeutschland 1945–1948. DVA, Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Abelshauser W (1981) Wiederaufbau vor dem Marshallplan. Westeuropas Wachstumschancen und die Wirtschaftsordnungspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte der vierziger Jahre. Vierteljahrsh Zeitgesch 29:545–578

    Google Scholar 

  • Abelshauser W (1984) Der Ruhrkohlenberghau seit 1945. Beck, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Abelshauser W (1985) Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1945–1980. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt

    Google Scholar 

  • Abramovitz M (1986) Catching up, forging ahead and falling behind. J Econ Hist 46:385–406

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson J (2005) The rise of Europe: Atlantic trade, institutional change, and economic growth. Am Econ Rev 95:546–579. doi:10.1257/0002828054201305

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adamsen HR (1981) Investitionshilfe für die Ruhr. Wiederaufbau, Vebände und Soziale Marktwirtschaft 1948–1952. Hammer, Wuppertal

    Google Scholar 

  • Alford B (1988) British economic performance, 1945–1975. Macmillan, Basingstoke

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson DI, LeRoy D (1987) The academy for German law: 1933–1944 (Garland, New York)

  • Barkai A (1990) Nazi economics: ideology, theory, and policy. Oxford, Berg

    Google Scholar 

  • Barro R, Sala-i-Martin X (1995) Economic growth. McGraw-Hill, New York

  • Barro R (1999) Notes on growth accounting. J Econ Growth 4:119–137. doi:10.1023/A:1009828704275

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumol W, Blackman B, Wolff E (1989) Productivity and American leadership. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Bean C, Crafts N (1996) British economic growth since 1945: relative economic decline… and renaissance? In: Crafts Ns, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 131–172

    Google Scholar 

  • Bel G (2006) Retrospectives: the coining of privatization and Germany’s National Socialist Party. J Econ Perspect 20:187–194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Berger H (1997) Konjunkturpolitik im Wirtschaftswunder: Handlungsspielräume und Verhaltensmuster von Bundesbank und Regierung in den 1950 er Jahren. Mohr, Tübingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Berger H, Ritschl A (1995) Germany and the political economy of the Marshall plan, 1947–1952: a re-revisionist view. In: Barry E (ed) Europe’s postwar recovery. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 199–245

    Google Scholar 

  • Berghahn V (1986) The Americanization of West German Industry 1945–1973. Berg, Leamington Spa

    Google Scholar 

  • Berghahn V, Vitols S (eds) (2006) Gibt es einen deutschen Kapitalismus? Campus, Frankfurt/Main

  • Birkenfeld W (1964) Der Synthetische Treibstoff, 1933–1945; ein Beitrag zur nationalsozialistischen Wirtschafts- und Rüstungspolitik. Muster-Schmidt, Göttingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Borchardt K (1976) Wachstum und Wechsellagen 1914/1970. In: Hermann A, Wolfgang Z (eds) Handbuch der deutschen Wirtschafts- und Sozialgeschichte. Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta

    Google Scholar 

  • Borchardt K (1977, 1991) Trends, cycles, structural breaks, chance: what determines twentieth century German economic history? in idem, perspectives on modern German economic history and policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 84–107

  • Booth A, Melling J, Dartmann C (1997) Institutions and economic growth: the politics of productivity in West Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 1945–1955. J Econ Hist 57:416–444

    Google Scholar 

  • Broadberry S (1994) Why was unemployment in postwar Britain so low? Bull Econ Res 46:241–261. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8586.1994.tb00590.x

    Google Scholar 

  • Broadberry S (1997) Anglo-German productivity differences, 1870–1990: a sectoral analysis. Eur Rev Econ Hist 1:247–267

    Google Scholar 

  • Broadberry S (2006) Market services and the productivity race, 1850–2000: Britain, the United States and Germany.University of Warwick, mimeo

  • Broadberry S, Crafts N (1992) Britain’s productivity gap in the 1930s: some neglected factors. J Econ Hist 52:531–558

    Google Scholar 

  • Broadberry S, Crafts N (1996) British economic policy and industrial performance in the early postwar period. Bus Hist 38:65–91. doi:10.1080/00076799600000135

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchheim C (1988) Die Währungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland. Vierteljahrsh Zeitgesch 36:189–231

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchheim C (1990) Die Wiedereingliederung Westdeutschlands in die Weltwirtschaft 1945–1958. Oldenbourg, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchheim C, Scherner J (2006) The role of private property in the Nazi economy: the case of industry. J Econ Hist 66:390–416

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Budraß L (1998) Flugzeugindustrie und Luftrüstung in Deutschland 1918–1945. Droste, Düsseldorf

    Google Scholar 

  • Carlin W (1996) West German growth and institutions. In: Crafts N, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 455–497

    Google Scholar 

  • Crafts N (1995) You’ve never had it so good? British economic policy and performance, 1945–60. In: Eichengreen B (ed) Europe’s postwar recovery. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 246–270

    Google Scholar 

  • Crafts N, Mills T (1996) Europe’s Golden age: an econometric investigation. In: van Ark B, Crafts N (eds) Quantitative aspects of postwar economic growth. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 415–431

    Google Scholar 

  • Denison E (1968) Economic growth. In: Caves Richard (ed) Britain’s economic prospects. Allen and Unwin, London, pp 231–278

    Google Scholar 

  • Deutsche Bundesbank (ed) (1976) Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen, 1876–1975 (Frankfurt: Knapp)

  • Dumke R (1990) Reassessing the Wirtschaftswunder: reconstruction and postwar growth in West Germany in an international context. Oxf Bull Econ Stat 52:451–491

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Edwards J, Fischer K (1994) Banks, finance and investment in Germany. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Eichengreen B (1996) Institutions and economic growth: Europe after World War II. In: Crafts N, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 38–70

    Google Scholar 

  • Erhard L (1960) Wohlstand für alle. Econ, Düsseldorf

    Google Scholar 

  • Eucken W (1940) Die Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. Fischer, Jena

    Google Scholar 

  • Feinstein CH (1972) National income, expenditure and output of the United Kingdom 1855–1965. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Feldman G (2001) Allianz and the German insurance business, 1933–1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan R, Soskice D, Ulman L (1974) Unionism, economic stabilization and incomes policy. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

    Google Scholar 

  • Gehrig G (1961) Eine Zeitreihe für den Sachkapitalbestand und die Investitionen. In: Gehrig G (ed) Bestimmungsfaktoren der deutschen Produktion (IFO-Studien 7)

  • Giersch H, Paqué K-H, Schmieding H (1992) The fading miracle. Four decades of market economy in Germany. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Gillingham J (1991) Coal, steel, and the rebirth of Europe, 1945–1955. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Grunenberg N (2006) Die Wundertäter. Netzwerke der deutschen Wirtschaft 1942–1966. Siedler, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall P, Soskice D (2001) Introduction In: Hall P, Soskice D (eds) Varieties of capitalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 1–70

  • Harris N (1972) Competition and the crporate society: British conservatives, the state and industry, 1945–1964. Methuen, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Hentschel V (1996) Ludwig Erhard: ein Politikerleben. Olzog, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Herbst L (1982) Der Totale Krieg und die Ordnung der Wirtschaft. Die Kriegswirtschaft im Spannungsfeld von Politik, Ideologie und Propaganda 1939–1945. Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffmann W (1965) Das Wachstum der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Springer, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoffmann WG, Müller H (1959) Das deutsche Volkseinkommen 1851–1957. Mohr, Tuebingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Holtfrerich C-L (1995) Die Deutsche Bank vom Zweiten Weltkrieg über die Besatzungsherrschaft zur Rekonstruktion 1945–1957. In: Lothar G et al. (eds) Die Deutsche Bank 1870–1995. Beck, Munich, pp 409–478

  • James H (1995) Die Deutsche Bank und die Diktatur. In: Gall L et al. (eds) Die Deutsche Bank 1870–1995. Beck, Munich, pp 315–408

  • James H (2001) The Deutsche bank and the Nazi economic war against the Jews. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Jánossy F (1969) The end of the economic miracle. ISAP, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Karlsch R (1993) Allein bezahlt? Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945. Links, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Kindleberger CP (1967) Europe’s postwar growth. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Kluge U (1988) Vierzig Jahre Agrarpolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Parey, Hamburg

    Google Scholar 

  • Koslowski P (ed) (1998) The social market economy: theory and ethics of the economic order. Springer, New York

  • Krengel R (1958) Anlagevermögen, Produktion und Beschäftigung der Industrie im Gebiet der Bundesrepublik von 1924 bis 1956. Duncker Humblot, Berlin

    Google Scholar 

  • Laitenberger V (1986) Ludwig Erhard. Der Nationalökonom als Politiker. Muster-Schmidt, Göttingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Lindlar L, Holtfrerich C-L (1997) Geography, exchange rates, and trade structures: Germany’s export performance since the 1950s. Eur Rev Econ Hist 1:217–246

    Google Scholar 

  • Maddison A (1991) Dynamic forces in capitalist development. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Maddison A (1995) Monitoring the World economy, 1820–1992. OECD, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Maddison A (2003) The World economy: historical statistics. OECD, Paris

    Google Scholar 

  • Mankiw G, Romer P, Weil P (1992) A contribution to the empirics of economic growth. Q J Econ 107:407–437. doi:10.2307/2118477

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Manz M (1968) Stagnation und Aufschwung in der französischen Besatzungszone von 1945 bis 1948. Ph.D. Diss, University of Mannheim

    Google Scholar 

  • Melzer M (1980) Anlagevermögen, Produktion und Beschäftigung der Industrie im Gebiet der DDR von 1936 bis 1978 sowie Schätzung des künftigen Angebotspotentials, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot (DIW Beiträge zur Strukturforschung 59)

  • Mierzejewski AC (2004) Ludwig Erhard. A biography. University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell B (1990) British historical statistics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell B (2003) International historical statistics: Europe 1750–2000. Macmillan, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Mollin G (1988) Montankonzerne und Drittes Reich. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Goettingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Musgrave R (1956) Steuerpolitik und Konjunktur. Wirtschaftsdienst 6:309–312

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson M (1982) The rise and decline of nations. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Olson M (1996) The varieties of Eurosclerosis: the rise and fall of nations since 1982. In: Crafts N, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 73–94

    Google Scholar 

  • Overmans R (1999) Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg. Oldenbourg, Munich

    Google Scholar 

  • Paqué K-H (1994) The causes of slumps and miracles: a critical evaluation of Olsonian views on the German economic miracle, CEPR discussion paper no. 981

  • Paqué K-H (1996) Why the 1950s and not the 1920s? Olsonian and non-Olsonian Interpretations of two decades of German economic history. In: Crafts N, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 95–106

    Google Scholar 

  • Plumpe W (1987) Vom Plan zum Markt: Wirtschaftsverwaltung und Unternehmerverbände in der britischen Zone. Schwann, Duesseldorf

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritschl A (1992) Die Wirtschaftspolitik des Dritten Reichs: Ein Überblick. In: Bracher K-D et al. (eds) Deutschland 1933–1945. Neue Studien zur nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft. Droste, Duesseldorf, pp 118–134

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritschl A (1996a) Sustainability of high public debt: what the historical record shows. Swed Econ Policy Rev 3:175–198

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritschl A (1996b) Aufstieg und Niedergang der DDR-Wirtschaft 1945–1989. Jahrb Wirtschaftsgesch 2:11–46

    Google Scholar 

  • Ritschl A (2005) Der späte Fluch des Dritten Reichs: Pfadabhängigkeiten in der Entstehung der bundesdeutschen Wirtschaftsordnung. Perspektiven Wirtschaftspolitik 6:151–170. doi:10.1111/j.1465-6493.2005.00174.x

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ritschl A, Spoerer M (1997) Das Bruttosozialprodukt in Deutschland nach den amtlichen Volkseinkommens- und Sozialproduktsstatistiken 1901–1995. Jahrb Wirtschaftsgesch 2:11–37

    Google Scholar 

  • Romer P (1987) Crazy explanations of the productivity slowdown, NBER macroeconomics annual. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Sicsic P, Wyplosz C (1996) France 1945–92. In: Crafts N, Toniolo G (eds) Economic growth in Europe since 1945. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 210–239

    Google Scholar 

  • Solow R (1957) Technical change and the aggregate production function. Rev Econ Stat 39:312–320. doi:10.2307/1926047

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Spoerer M, Fleischhacker J (2002) Forced laborers in Nazi Germany: categories, numbers, and survivors. J Interdiscip Hist 33:169–204. doi:10.1162/00221950260208661

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Temin P (2002) The golden age of European growth reconsidered. Eur Rev Econ Hist 6:3–22. doi:10.1017/S1361491602000011

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Temple J (2001) Structural change and Europe’s golden age, unpublished manuscript, University of Bristol

  • Vonyó T (2008) Post-war reconstruction and the golden age of economic growth. Eur Rev Econ Hist 12:221–241

    Google Scholar 

  • Wellhoener V (1989) Großbanken und Großindustrie im Kaiserreich. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen

    Google Scholar 

  • Wixforth H (1995) Banken und Schwerindustrie in der Weimarer Republik. Boehlau, Cologne

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

A draft of this paper was written while the first author was visiting the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford, whose hospitality is acknowledged with thanks. The second author acknowledges financial support from DGICYT, Project PB94–1001, and from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under SFB 649. We thank Sudarat Ananchotikul and Ye Wang for help with data and Ian McLean and Peter Temin for helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Albrecht Ritschl.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Eichengreen, B., Ritschl, A. Understanding West German economic growth in the 1950s. Cliometrica 3, 191–219 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-008-0035-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11698-008-0035-7

Keywords

JEL Classification

Navigation